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INTRODUCTION 
In Part IV of his Systematic Theology, entitled "Life and 
the Spirit," Paul Tillich makes the statement: 
Logically; this could be the place for a fully 
developed philosophy of religion (including an inter-
pretation of the history of religion). But practi-
cally this is impossible in the limits of this system, 
which is not a sum.ma.I 
This paper is an analysis of some of the implications of this 
statement, that is, a study of some of the definitions, prin-
ciples, and terms by which Paul Tillich has attempted to under-
stand religion and the religious dimension of man. By focusing 
upon one part of his Systematic Theology, this paper attempts 
to provide some understanding of the thought of one of the 
major contemporary thinkers in the philosophy of religion. 
Paul Tillich has made many recognized and oft-quoted 
contributions in the philosophy of relig~on. That he has 
influenced many contemporary philosophers and theologians is 
obvious to anyone doing work in that field. Yet, some of his 
basic principles, definitions, and terms prove difficult to 
understand. His thought is often unclear because his language 
often lacks precise definition and consistency; 2 Tillich 
1Pa.ul Tillich, Systematic Theol~ (Chicago: University·of 
Cnicago Press, Vol. III, 1963), PP• -5. (In this paper this 
work will be abbreviated ST.) 
2Tillich mentions such criticism of his work and attempts 
1 
2 
is sometimes more the preacher than the philosopher. His moti-
vation is sometimes more a matter of religious inspiration than 
a desire for precision and consistency.3 This lack of clarity 
presents some of the major difficulty in doing this paper and 
at the same time furnishes a need to which this paper attempts 
to respond. 
This paper will analyze some of the principles, definitions, 
and terms of Tillich's understanding of religion by interpret-
ing his thought in the first division of Part IV of his Systematic 
Theology. His other works will be used only when they are help-
ful in clarifying something that he is stating in Part IV. 
Secondary sources will be used sparingly where they prove help-
ful to' the interpretation.4 
Part IV of the Systematic Theology has two major divisions, 
as do all the parts of this work. The two parts correspond to 
the basic methodology used by Tillich in his Systematic Theology, 
to respond to it in his "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," 
The Theology of Paul Tillich, edited by c. Kegley and R. Bretall 
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 330. 
3Ibid., 341. (In responding to the criticism that some of 
his language-is baffling and his metaphors unhappy, Tillich 
states his case for religious motivation being often the decid-
ing factor). 
4Guyton B. Hammond, Man in Estrangement (Nashville: Vander-
bilt University Press, 1965). This work, subtitled A Comparison 
of the Thought of Paul Tillich and Erich Fromm, is one of the 
few secondary sources which treats Part IV of the S~stematic 
Theology (and the only work which offered a detaile study of 
~he importance of the concept of life for an understanding of 
Tillich's thought.) Most of the standard secondary sources 
concerning Tillich's thought were published before the publi-
cation of Part IV, and the few published after (Armbruster, 
Tait, Hamilton) present only a·cursory treatment of Part IV 
(and especially Tillich's use of the concept of life). 
• 3 
the method of correlation.5 F.ach part of his 8ystematic Theol-
gJS;!. consists, first, of the philosophical statement and analysis 
of a problem or question and, secondly, of the theological 
development of a solution or answer to that problem or question. 
In the first division of Part IV of his Systematic Theology, 
Paul Tillich presents his philosophical statement and analysis 
of a problem-question: "Life, its Ambiguities, and the Quest for 
the Unambiguous Life." In the second division, consisting of 
three sections: "The Spiritual Presence," "The Divine Spirit and 
the Ambiguities of Life," and "The Trinitarian Symbols," Tillich 
presents the correlate, the theQlogical development of a solu-
tion-answer: the Spirit and the Unambiguous Life. 
Tillich formulates his question and answer in Part IV in 
terms of life: the question posed by ambiguous life and the 
answer found in unambiguous life. The concept of life is cen-
tral to Tillich's methodology and development of his thought. 
Tillich uses it eventually in Part IV to formulate his princi-
ples, definitions, and terms for an understanding of religion. 
An analysis of this concept, therefore, is fundamental to any 
of the other analyses of this paper and is the first goal of 
this paper. 
In the "Introduction" to Part IV of his Systematic Theol-
2Slt Paul Tillich faces the accusation that his attempt to 
systematize theology is, in fact, an attempt "to rationalize 
revelatory experiences. 116 Tillich denies the charge and retorts 
5Tillich, .§!, Vol. I, 1951, PP• 56-66. 
6Tillich, fil, Vol. III, p •. 3. 
• 4 
that the systematic form is a "justifiable demand to be consis-
tent in one's statements."? In addition, systematic form is 
"an instrument by which relations between symbols and concepts 
are discovered and by which the wholeness of the object of the-
ology is conceived as a Gestalt in which many parts and ele-
ments are united by determining principles and dynamic inter-
8 
relations." 
Paul Tillich states his case for the necessity of using 
organizing principles which go beyond biblical language, and, 
therefore, the necessity of utilizing philosophical concepts, 
if the revelatory experiences are to be shared with the larger 
audience of mankind, the audience outside a particular "theolog-
ical circle." According to Tillich, the Christian theologian 
must use non-biblical language, if his faith insights are to be 
compared with, and to criticize various insights or science and 
philosophy. Otherwise, theology and the theologian's faith 
exist in an isolated world, unable to speak to the world at 
large and unable to be spoken to. 
Tillich states the reasons for his use of the concept of 
life in the first division of Part IV. Tillich notes the encour-
agement he drew from reading Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's book, 
The Phenomenon of Man. "It encouraged me greatly to know that 
an acknowledged scientist had developed ideas about the dimen-
sions and processes of life so similar to my- own." Paul Tillich 
pt 
5 
summarizes his intentions for using the concept of life to 
develop his thought in Part IV of his Systematic Theology:9 
Of course, theology cannot rest on scientific 
theory. But it must relate its understanding of man 
to an understanding of universal nature, for man is 
a part of nature and statements about nature underlie 
every statement about him. The sections in this book 
on the dimensions and ambiguities of life attempt to 
make explicit what is implicit in even the most anti-
philosophical theologies. Even if the questions about 
the relations of man to nature and to the universe 
could be avoided by theologians, they would still be 
asked by people of every time and place--often with 
existential urgency and out of cognitive honesty. And 
the lack of an answer can become a stumbling block for 
a man's whole religious life. These are the reasons 
why I ventured to enter, from the theological point of 
view, the field of a philosophy of life, fully aware 
of the cognitive risks involved.lo 
Some of the implications of this brief summary will be analyzed 
in this paper • 
Paul Tillich is concerned with the necessity of theology's 
dialogue with the sciences, physical, social, and psychological. 
He is· interested in developing his basic theological concerns 
and insights in light of the concerns and insights offered by 
the sciences. Whereas the central concepts used by Tillich in 
the first three parts of his Systematic Theology were more tra-
ditionally philosophical (e.g., concepts such as being, non-
being), the central concept used in Part IV is the concept of 
life. 
This paper is an attempt to interpret Paul Tillich's 
philosophical statement and analysis of a problem-question: 
9Ibid., p. 5. 
lOibid. 
p 
Ambiguous life and the quest for Unambiguous life. 
be accomplished by a triple analysis. 
6 
This will 
In chapter one Tillich's concept of life will be analyzed. 
It will be shown that an understanding of his basic definition 
of life is dependent upon a definition of terms which can be 
found only in some of his work written prior to Part IV of his 
~stematic Theology. It will also be shown that Tillich's 
formulation of a question and answer in terms of life is another 
attempt by Tillich to point to a concern central and fundamental 
in much of his thought. By studying this fundamental concern 
it is hoped that some of Tillich's thought, especially in the 
philosophy of religion, will be more intelligible. 
In chapter two, the concept of the self-transcendence of 
life will be analyzed. This is the fundamental characteristic 
of life according to Tillich. It is in terms of this concept 
that Tillich presents ·his analysis of the ambiguity of life. 
In this chapter an interpretation of Tillich's analysis of the 
first two functions of life will be presented: self-integration 
and self-creativity. Tillich's analysis of these two functions 
focuses upon morality and culture. This paper hopes to present 
a schema or structure by which Tillich's analysis of the first 
two functions of life can be more clearly understood and which 
will also provide a means of interpreting Tillich's analysis 
of the third function of life. 
In chapter three Tillich's concept of the self-transcen-
dence of life, not in its general sense as found in chapter two, 
but in a more specific sense, will be analyzed. This more 
? 
specific concept of the self-transcendence of life is the third 
function of life and also Tillich's definition of religion. An 
analysis of this third function of life yields a clearer under-
standing of some of the principles, terms, and definitions of 
Paul Tillich's philosophy of religion. 
p 
CHAPrER I 
THE CONCEPT OF LIFE 
What Paul Tillich attempted to say consistently in the 
first three parts of his Systematic Theologl with the more tra-
ditionally philosophical concepts of being, non-being, essence, 
and existence, he attempts to say consistently in Part IV with 
the concepts of ambiguous and unambiguous life. There is a 
difference in emphasis, yet Tillich is attempting to share his 
faith concerns and insights with man.kind, a community larger 
than his particular theological circle.1 
That Tillich's use of the concept of life is important 
tor understanding his work and that its use points more to a 
change in emphasis than to any change in his fundamental con-
-
cerns and insights is supported by Guyton B. Hammond in his 
book, Man in Estrangement •. 2 Langdon Gilkey in his forward to 
Hammond's book commends the author for pointing out the impor-
tance of the concept of life for an appreciation of Tillich's 
thought3 and for showing that Tillich's tnought is not as static 
1In Part IV, published six years after Part III and twelve 
years after Parts I and II, Tillich's use of the concept of life 
is an attempt to enter into theology's necessary dialogue with 
the sciences. 
2cf. "Introduction," n. 4. 
3La~gdon Gilkey, in the foreward of Guyton B. Hammond, Man 
in Estrangement (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 196'5")," 
p. x. 
8 
p 
9 
as might be suggested by the Greek categories of being and non-
being, the terms which are so fundamental to Tillich's thought 
in the first three parts of his Systematic Theology. Hammond 
suggests that Tillich in his later work, especially Part IV of 
his szstematic Theologz uses the more dynamic concept of life; 
yet this concept of life is built upon the categories of being 
and non-being and can only be understood in terms of these cate-
gories. 
We might observe here that Tillich's concept of 
life contains the ideas of the overcoming of non-being, 
the movement from potentiality to actuality, creativity, 
self-transcendence, freedom, and self-consciousness. 
Surely a concept with this richness of implication is 
a key to much of Tillich's system and cannot be ignored 
in any exposition of its main themes. It would appear 
that many of the critical appraisals of Tillich's thought 
have overlooked the centrality of this conception.4 
A Definition of Terms 
An understanding of Tillich's principal definition of life 
("the actualization of potential being,"5).depends upon terms 
which are not explicitly defined in Part IV, but whose defini-
tion must be found in some of his other works. Such terms as 
being, non-being, potential, actual must be defined before Til-
lich's definitions of life can be interpreted in the context of 
Part IV. 
Tillich defines philosophy as the cognitive endeavor con-
cerned with being as being.6 It is being, or the mystery of 
4Hammond, p. 107. 
5Tillich, .§!, Vol. III, p~ 12. 
6Tillich, .§!, Vol. I, P• 21. 
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being, which is the object of his philosophical investigations 
and analyses. It is important to attend to the fact that 
Tillich makes a fundamental distinction within being itself. 
His use of terms often reflects this fundamental distinction, 
and this will be demonstrated in regard to the distinction 
between ambiguous and unambiguous life. 
There are two concepts of being. One is the result 
of the most radical abstraction and means not being 
this, not being that, not being anything in particular, 
simply being. This indeed is an empty absolute. 
The other concept of being is the result of two 
profound experiences, one of them negative, the other 
positive. · 
The negative experience is the shock of non-being 
that can be experienced in· theoretical imagination by 
those who are philosophers by nature. If one is not a 
philosopher, one can have it as a simple human being, 
in the practical experience of having to die. 
But there is not only the shock of non-being. 
There is also a positive experience. It is the exper-
ience of eros,--relation to being itself.( 
These two experi~nces of being, the negative and positive, are 
fundamental and basic to his thought. 
According to Paul Tillich, the beginning of philosophical 
thought is the shock of non-being. It is man's threatened state 
that causes him to wonder, to think, to organize, to figure 
things out, to try to piece things together, to discover some 
unity and order amid the chaos which faces him. Non-being is 
at the beginning. 
Kenneth Hamilton in his book, The System and the Gospel, 
severely criticizes Tillich's thought especially in regards to 
what he thinks is Tillich's central problem: "an attempt to 
7Paul Tillich,~ Search for.Absolutes (New York: Simon 
and Schuster Press, 67), pp. 81-2. 
p 
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rationalize revelatory experiences. 118 Hamilton often, yet not 
happily, notes the importance of such philosophical categories 
as being and non-being for Tillich's philosophical theology. 
Because it is solely through the anxiety born of 
non-being that we encounter ontological shock and become 
aware of the power of being within us, non-being is less 
fatal than friendly. And we do not meet non-being on 
its own but always as 'digested' within being.9 
It is man's threatened state which causes him to be anxious, 
in need of the "courage to be," prone to despair, and always 
ready to find some security against what threatens him. Til-
lich provides a very detailed analysis of the despair and the 
anxiety resulting from this threat in his rather psychologically-
oriented book, The Courage to Be. It is this relation of non-
being to being, the necessity of being to resist non-being that 
causes Tillich to speak of the "power of being," a phrase funda-
mental to understanding the dialectical definition of many of 
his concepts. This is true especially for his definition of 
life. 
Paul Tillich focuses upon man's attempts to deal with non-
being. His interpretations of past philosophers and philosophies, 
his own original contributions to philosophy and especially to 
the philosophy of religion, are critiques of human responses and 
reactions to this primary experience--the experience of being in 
despair, the experience of non-being. 
8Kenneth Hamilton, The S'stem and the Gospel (Michigan: 
William B. Eerdman Press, 196 ), pp. 12-13. 
9Ibid., pp. 195-6. 
12 
It cannot be otherwise, for the first step of the · 
creative philosopher is radical doubt.· He questions 
not only the traditions and· symbols of the comm.unity 
to which he belongs but also what is called the "natural 
world view," the common-sense presuppositions of ·11 every-
body." He who seriously asks the question: Why is there 
something not nothing? has experienced the shock of non-
being and has in thought transcended everything given 
in nature and mankind.10 
Tillich's emphasis upon the negative experience of being accounts 
for his particular understanding of human life with its emphasis 
upon the tragic dimensions of that life. This will be demon-
strated especially in his critiques of morality, culture, and 
religion. 
The Threat of Non-being 
A failure to recognize the distinctions Tillich makes in 
his use of the concept of non-being leads to unnecessary confu-
sion. 
The mystery.of non-being demands a dialectical ap-
proach. The genius of the Greek language has provi~ed 
a possibility of distinguishing the dialectical concept 
of non-being from the non-dialectical by calling the 
first me on and the second ouk on. OUk on is the 
'nothing' which has no relation at all to being; me on 
is the 'nothing' which has a dialectical relation to 
being.11 
Absolute non-being, ouk-on, is the opposite of being, its con-
tradiction. It has no being, no reality. Relative non-being, 
the dialectical concept of me on is a reality. It is "within 
being." 
10Paul Tillich, Biblical Reli5ion and the Search for 
Ultimate Reality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955). 
11Tillich, _§!, Vol. I, pp. 187-8. 
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According to Tillich, it is in Plato's philosophical thought 
that the concept of non-being is for the first time dealt with 
thoroughly. Yet in Platonism non-being is an ultimate principle; 
it resists being, resists form. In Greek philosophy it becomes 
an independent principle. 
The me-ontic matter of Platonism represents the 
dualistic element which underlies all paganism and. 
which is the ultimate ground of the tragic interpre-
tation of life.12 
Tillich states that it is Christian theology which refuses to 
accept that non-being is an independent principle. It is Chris-
tian faith which struggles against all forms of dualism. The 
Christian doctrine of creation from nothing philosophically 
stated, is esse qua esse est bonum. The mythic structure of 
Genesis is a struggle with the dualistic myths of Israel's 
near eastern neighbors. 
In Greek philosophy non-being, or matter, was an 
ultimate principle, the principle of resistence against 
form. Christian theology, however, has had to try to 
deprive it of its independence and to seek a place for 
it in the depths of the divine life.13 
Yet, for all Tillich's disclaiming of dualism in the name 
of Christian theology, he is still accused of surrendering to 
the Greek dualism he attacks. Hamilton quotes one of these 
attacks, that of J. H. Thomas; "What Tillich has done is to 
make the 'nothing' out of which we come a something with fata~ 
power. Hence, as I suggested, we are once more faced with 
12Ibid., p. 188. 
l3Ibid., pp. 179-80. 
-
p 
])Ualism."14 Yet Hamilton responds to Thomas' criticism of 
Tillich: 
The dualism which Thomas thinks he sees is a 
limited dualism only, incapable of disrupting the 
system's basic monism. There can be no 'fatal power' 
in non-being because, whether we know it or not, the 
objective situation is that being-itself is eternally 
vanquishing non-being. Indeed being itself needs the 
non-being it conquers, just as animals need food to 
kill and eat. Without non-being being itself could 
14 
not be what it is. Man's anxiety,_ therefore, may tend 
in the direction of despair but total despair is not 
possible for man without total loss of his humanity. 
The one effective power in the Universe is the power 
manifested in eros-faith and this is the power which 
(though hidden) remains always in spite of the existen-
tial predicament. After all, existence is a predicament 
merely. Its chief feature is its self-contradictori- 15 ness. It contains tragic elements, but it is not tragic. 
Tillich's ontological analysis is basically an analysis of 
human existence and existence in general. Existence is problem-
atical, yet for Tillich, not insolubly so. What exists is that 
which stands out from non-being. Existence is a dialectical 
term in Tillich's thought; it is defined in terms of non-being 
at the start, but faith can displace despair. 
Summarizing our etymological inquiry, we can say: 
Existing can mean standing out of absolute non-being, 
while remaining in it; it can mean finitude, the unity 
of being and non-being. And existing can mean standing 
out of ~elative non-being, while remaining in it; it 
can mean actuality, the unity of actual being and the 
resistance against it. But whether we use the one or 
the other meaning of non-being, existence means stand-
ing out of non-being.16 
Absolute non-being, ouk on, is nothing; it has no reality. 
14Hamilton, p. 194. 
l5Ib·d 195 
--L· t p. • 
16Tillich, §!, Vol. II, P·· 21. 
15 
Relative non-being, me on, is within being; it has reality. 
This is a distinction which is not always clearly stated in the 
writings of Tillich, and this lack of clear statement ca~ 
account for some of the lack of clarity in his thought and 
terminology. 
Relative non-being, me-on, is an expression for potentiality 
in Tillich's thought. This point is most important for under-
standing Tillich's definition of life as the "actualization of 
potential being."17 Relative non-being is the potential which, 
along with the actual, are the two most fundamental categories 
of Being in Tillich's thought. As was just quoted: "And exist-
ing can mean standing out of relative non-being, while remaining. 
in it;' it can mean actuality, the unity of actual being and the 
resistence against it." For Tillich, the existent is the actual 
standing out of and within the potential. 
In order ~o ·oecome actual, it must overcome rela-
tive non-being, the state of me on. But again it can-
not be completely out of it. It must stand out and-
stand in it at the same time. An actual thing stands 
out of mere potentiality; but it also remains in it. 
It never pours its power of being completely into its 
state of existence. It never fully exhausts its poten-
tiality. It remains not only in absolute non-being, 
as its finitude shows, but also in relative non-being, 
as the changing character of its existence shows. The 
Greeks symbolize this as the resistance of me-on of 
relative non-being, against the actualization of that 
which is potential in a thing.18 
If relative non-being, me on, is the potential, then the 
threat of non-being is the threat of the potential. Tillich's 
l7Tillich, Vol. III, p. 30. 
18Tillich, _§!, Vol. II, p. 21. 
16 
understanding and use of relative non-being, of potentiality, 
is fundamental to his particular definition of life and espe-
cially to his understanding of the religious dimensions of 
human existence. When Tillich speaks of the tragedy of human 
existence or the ambiguity of human life, or when he emphasizes 
the negative experience of being in his understanding of the 
religious dimension of man, he does so out of his particular 
understanding and use of the concept of relative non-being as 
potentiality. 
Man is threatened by the shock of non-being. Not only is 
man threatened by absolute non-being, by the fact that he is 
finite, (graphically expressed in the fact of death), but man 
is threatened by relative-non-being, by the potential, by his 
own potentiality. For Tillich, man's greatness is in what he 
can become, but man's potential greatness is also his weakness, 
a constant threat. 
Tillich fears man. He is afraid of what man eight do and 
become. Human potential is often so destructive and tragic, 
so self-destructive. History and the behavioral sciences pro-
vide ample evidence of human destruction and self-destruction. 
Philosophy and religion constantly attempt to minimize the risk 
within man's potential greatness by their attempts at criticism 
and guidance whether in terms of ethical imperatives or cultural 
values. The tragedy of human existence appears to be a more 
concrete statement of the shock of non~being. And Tillich 
appears to be duly shocked in many of his analyses of the struc-
tures of human existence whether it be human freedom, human 
17 
knowledge, or human creativity. Paul Tillich, the Protestant 
philosopher, 19 is afraid of man's "good works." To put it 
more philosophically, human potentiality is ambiguous: "The 
tragic is the inner ambiguity of human greatness."20 The root 
of Tillich's emphasis upon the negative and tragic in human 
life is in the ambiguity of man's non-being, his potentiality. 
At the moment when man becomes conscious of his 
freedom the awareness of his dangerous situation gets 
hold of him. He experiences a double threat, which 
is rooted in his finite freedom and expressed in anxi• 
ety. Man experiences the anxiety of losing himself by 
not actualizing himself and his potentialities and the 
anxiety Of losing himself by actualizing himself and 
his potentialities. He stands between the preservation 
of his dreaming innocence without experiencing the 
actuality of being and the loss of his innocence through 
knowledge, power, and guilt. The anxiety of this situa-
tion is the state of temptation. Man decides for self-
actualization, thus producing the end of dreaming inno-
cence.21 
A Search for Limits: A Fundamental Concern 
Man has within his being non-being. He is in the state of 
temptation; he has everything to gain, everything to lose. His 
s-ituation is ambiguous and distorted. The question .facing Til-
lich is: What can resolve this ambiguity? What will determine 
whether human life becomes creative and self-affirming or tragic 
l9G. McLean, "Paul Tillich's ~istential Philosophy of 
Protestantism," Thomist, Vol. 28 (Jan., 1964), pp. 1-50. McLean 
mentions how much Tillich's Lutheran Protestant heritage has 
influenced many of the emphases in his thought, especially his 
emphasis upon the negative aspects of being, life, and religion. 
This relationship accounts for the rather strange combination of 
words: Protestant Philosopher. 
20Tillich, §!, Vol. III, p. 34. 
21Tillich, §.!, Vol. II, p. 35. 
18 
and self-destructive? For Tillich, man is faced with the neces-
sity of finding limits, creative limitations for his own poten-
tiality. Much of Tillich's thought and especially his treatment 
of ambiguous and unambiguous life is an attempt to face this 
fundamental problem, to delineate the correct limits, to define 
how man's potential should be actualized. It is in terms of 
these limitations and definitions that·.Tillich attempts to 
understand the structures of human existence (as will be seen 
in chapter two), and it is in these terms that Tillich attempts 
to understand the religious dimension of human existence (as 
will be seen in chapter three). 
According to Paul Tillich, with the proper and correct 
limits, man's non-being can be creative, freeing, loving, self-
affirmative; without limits, or with improper and incorrect 
limits, human potentiality is self-destructive, hateful, licen-
tious, and tragic. What are these creative limits for man's 
potentiality? What are the protective curbs for man's drives? 
What makes potential self-destruction an actual fulfillment? 
In this paper Tillich's attempt to answer these questions in 
terms of ambiguous and unambiguous life, the fundamental con-
cepts of Part IV of his Systematic Theology, will be analyzed. 
An attempt to answer this question of limits is central and 
fundamental to Tillich's thought. It expresses his basic method, 
the method of correlation and it is found ultimately in his 
analysis of the religious dimension of man. According to Til-
lich, religion and theology are primarily concerned with the 
setting of limits. How well any religion or theology or quasi-
---
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religious answer succeeds in this task is a question to be con-
tinually asked as the attempted answers are subjected to criti-
cism and evaluation. 
What are the proper and correct limits for man's potential-
ity,? What are the forms that can creatively shape human life, 
that can resist non-being? Or to put it in another way, what 
are the structures, whether they be mythic, symbolic, or con-
ceptual, which can resist and order the chaos? Tillich summarizes 
his answer in his treatment of justice, the seeking for propor-
tion, form, and balance. In his book Love, Power and Justice it 
is justice which delimits and defines the love and power of man. 
It is difficult to read the book without hearing in the back-
ground Saint Paul's and, later, Luther's cries to rid man of his 
injustice and to find for him some justification, some new order 
of things. "To be just towards oneself means to actualize as 
many ·potentialities as possible without losing oneself in dis-
ruption and chaos. 1122 
Tillich's attempt to answer the question of creative limits 
for human potentiality and to evaluate the answers of others, be 
they philosophical, theological, or quasi-religious, is rooted 
in his conviction, prejudiced as it may be by his Christian 
faith, that the criterion of any creative limit for man is the 
definite demanding - other which stands "over against" man. 
It is the definite other which sets the bounds, provides the 
limits, makes possible creative action, and indeed demands 
22Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1954), p. ?o. 
•, 
20 
self-creative action. It is the definite other which keeps man 
from destroying himself, by not allowing him to forget his 
limitations and insuf'ficiencies, by not allowing him to be more 
than a man, and therefore, less than a man. 
According to Tillich, it is the definite other as object 
which makes knowledge and truth possible and illusion and sub-
jectivism impossible. Tillich clearly ·states this need for the 
definite other when he speaks of human freedom: 
\lb.en man makes himself the center of the universe, 
freedom loses its definiteness. Indefinitely and arbi-
trarily, freedom turns to objects, persons, and things 
which are completely contingent upon the choosing sub-
ject and which therefore can be replaced by others of 
equal contingency and ultimate unrelatedness. Existen-
tialism, supported by depth psychology, describes the 
dialectics 8f this situation in terms of the restless-
ness, emptiness, and meaninglessness connected with it. 
If no essential relation between a free agent and his 
objects exist, no choice is objectively preferable to 
any other; no commitment to a cause or a person is 
m~aningful; no dominant purpose can be established. 
The indications coming from one's destiny remain 
unnoticed or are disregarded. This certainly is the 
description of an extreme situation; but in its radical-
ism it can reveal a basic trend in the state of uni-
versal estrangement.23 
According to Tillich it is this definite otherness which 
makes love and morality possible and selfishness and cynicism 
impossible. 
For in man's essential nature the desire to be 
united with the object of one's love for its own sake 
is effective. And this desire is not infinite but24 definite. It is not concupiscence but love ••• 
It is this definite otherness which stands "over against" 
man that keeps him humble, that gives form to his unlimited 
23Tillich, §!, Vol. III, p. 63. 
24Ibid.' p. 54. 
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potentialities, that makes his potentiality non-threatening. 
It is this definite otherness which makes man aware of his fini-
tude. It is this definite otherness which is the antidote to 
man's tendency to deify his thoughts, his ideas, his choices, 
his actions. In this context Tillich's constant fashioning of 
the enemy in terms of the demonic, the idolatrous, the blas-
phemous appears to be an appropriate way of accusing man of the 
fanaticism and arbitrariness that rests within him. 
Tillich often attempts to make his case by pointing to the 
subject of Greek tragedy: 
Man is tempted to make himself existentially the 
center of himself and his world. When looking at him-
self and his world, he realizes his freedom and, with 
it, his potential infinity. He realizes that he is 
not bound to any special situation or element in it. 
But at the same time, he knows that he is finite. It 
was this situation which induced the Greeks to call 
men "the mortals" and to attribute man's potential 
infinity to the gods, calling them "the immortals." 
Man could create the images of the immortal gods only 
because he was aware of his own potential infinity. 
Standing between actual finitude and potential infinity 
enables him to call men and only men "mortals" (although 
all beings have to die) and to call the divine images 
of men the"immortals." If man does not acknowledge 
this situation - the fact that he is excluded from the 
infinity of the gods - he falls into hubris. He ele-
vates himself beyond the limits of his finite being and 
provokee the divine wrath which destroys him. This is 
the main subject of Greek tragedy.25 
To summarize, man is shocked by non-being. He has non-being 
within himself. Man's situation is ambiguous because his great 
potential can either create him or destroy him. The ·difference 
lies in the correct and proper limit. Man finds his creative 
limit in the other, the basis of truth and love, the basis of 
25Tillich, fil, Vol. II, pp. 49-50. 
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every attempt of man to formulate and use religious spee·ch and 
symbolism. It is the other which keeps man honest and humble. 
It is the other which can save him from himself. Theologically 
stated, no man can save himself. Man is saved by God alone. 
The distinction of being and non-being is fundamental to 
Tillich's thought. The shock of non-being is the beginning of 
human questioning and the possibility of attempting some answers. 
The threat of non-being is the threat of man's own unlimited 
potentiality. The threat becomes a promise given the right 
remedy. Man's greatness is in the fact that he has so much 
non-being. 
Life: A More Inclusive Definition 
Tillich's definition of life and his use of this concept 
in Part IV of his Systematic Theology is fundamentally rooted 
in his understanding of the distinction between being and non-
being especially as this distinction underlies his meaning when 
he states that life is "the actualization of potential being." 
Tillich begins Part IV of his Systematic Theology by defin-
ing his use of the concept of life. He states that many phil-
osophers have tended to avoid the word because of its various· 
meanings while others have tended to restrict it to the organic 
world. Tillich intends to give the concept a specific meaning, 
but he refuses to restrict it to the organic world of living 
things. For Tillich, it will be defined in a specific but 
broad sense. 
In rejecting the term "process" in favor of "life" as the 
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fundamental concept for his thought in Part IV Tillich graphic-
ally states his basic feeling for this concept to which he will 
later give more precise definition. 
The term "process" is much less equivocal than 
the term "life" but also much less expressive. The 
living and dead body are equally subject to "Process," 
but in the fact of death, "life" includes its own 
negation. The emphatic use of the word "life" serves 
to indicate the conquest of this negation - as in 
"life reborn" or in "eternal life •. 11 26 
In his attempt to define the concept of life, which hints 
at the way he will use it in the development of the thought, 
Tillich first mentions the polar concept of life. It is polar 
because it implies its opposite, and is in dialectical tension 
with its opposite. "Perhaps it is not too bold to assume that 
the words for life first arose through the experience of death. 
In any case, the polarity of life and death has always colored 
the word 'life.• 27 
From the polar concept of life Tillich moves to the generic 
concept, "a special group of existing beings under the predomi-
nance of the organic dimension. 1128 
But it is Tillich's intention to further define and broaden 
the concept of life. The ontological concept of life is formed 
after the pattern of the generic concept of life. 
The observation of a particular potentiality of 
being, whether it is that of a species or of indi-
viduals actualizing themselves in time and space, has 
led to the ontological concept of life - life as the 
26Tillich, £!, Vol. III, p. 11. 
27Ibid. 
28Ibid. 
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"actuality of Being."29 
It is the ontological concept of life, as defined by Tillich 
in the very beginning of Part IV, which focuses his a tten.tion 
upon what is to be investigated in Part IV. 
The ontological concept of life liberates the word 
"life" from its bondage to the organic realm and elevates 
it to the level of a basic term that can be used within 
the theological system only if interpreted in Existential 
terms. The term "process" is not open to such interpreta-
tion, although in many instances it is helpful to speak 
of life processes.30 
Life, like potency and act, focuses Tillich's attention 
upon the basic structures of being. For Tillich the structures 
of being shape all reality and these structures reveal being to 
be in a state of tension. This state of tension can be objec-
tively' analyzed by the philosopher in many different ways, but, 
as Tillich states it, this tension only has significance for the 
theologian when it is interpreted in existential terms, that is, 
in terms of the felt rieeds arising from an encounter with the 
negative dimensions of being and life. For Tillich, existence 
bespeaks predicament, estrangement, and tragedy. Man feels the 
threat of non-being, the ambiguity of his life. Philosophical 
and theological language cannot abstract from the concrete 
existential situation. The shock of non-being, often cast in 
terms of dread, despair, and anxiety, and the experience of being, 
in terms of promise, faith, and mystery, that is, "interpreted 
in Existential terms," meet Tillich's needs as a philosopher 
and Christian theologian. 
29Ibid. 
-30~. 
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The Spiritual Dimension: A Question of Metaphors 
Since the ontological concept of life is broader and more 
inclusive than the ordinary meaning of life, Tillich is cautious 
in how he will express the unifying aspect of a concept which 
includes such a diversity of beings. In his essential consider-
ation of life, Tillich speaks of a "multidimensional unity of 
life. 11 Tillich is faced with a decision concerning which terms 
he will use to seek and describe this unity of diversity. Con-
fronted with this problem of the one and the many, Tillich's 
solution is in terms of the proper metaphors to be used when 
describing the multidimensional unity of life. 
Tillich shows which metaphors he will accept and which 
metaphors he will exclude in describing life. When speaking 
of life, Tillich intends to speak of the "dimensions of life," 
and not the "levels of life." 
The term 'level' is a metaphor which emphasizes 
the equality of all objects belonging to a particular 
level. They are 'leveled,' that is, brought to a 
common plane and kept on it. There is no organic 
movement from one to the other; the higher is not 
implicit in the lower, and the lower is not implicit 
in the higher. The relation of the levels is th~f 
o.f interference, either by control or by revolt.~ 
The metaphor 'level' betrays its inadequacy when 
the relation of different levels is under considera-
tion. The choice of the metaphor had far-reaching 
consequences for the whole cultural situation. And, 
conversely~ the choice itself expressed a cultural 
situation.72 
Tillich in this last quotation is especially referring to the 
31~.' p. 13. 
32~., p. 14. 
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way of describing the relation of the inorganic to the organic 
in certain scientific theories, but his opposition to the use 
of the metaphor of "level" when speaking of the plurality of 
beings included in the concept of life is even more comprehen-
sive than t.his particular relationship. For Tillich, the 
metaphor of "level" is reductionist and reifying, a matter 
bespeaking mutual separation and interference. Tillich exem-
plified his position by showing how problems arise when "level" 
is used in speaking of such traditional relationships as the 
organic to the inorganic, nature to grace, faith to reason, 
mind to body, religion to cultU+-e, and God to man.33 
Whereas the metaphor of "level" tends to emphasize differ-
.ence and conflict, the metaphor of "dimension" tends to "repre-
sent an encounter with reality in which the unity of life is 
seen above its conflicts." For Tillich, the metaphor of "dimen-
sion" implies a different vision of reality, that is, different 
from the vision implied in the metaphor of "level." 
The metaphor "dimension" is also taken from the 
spatial sphere, but it describes the difference of the 
realms of being in such a way that there cannot be 
mutual interference. Depth does not interfere with 
breadth, since all dimensions meet in some point. 
They cross without disturbing each other; there is no 
conflict between dimensions.54 
For Tillich, the basic dimensions of life are the inorga~ic, 
the organic, the spiritual, and the historical. All four are 
actual in man, although man is especially characterized by the 
spiritual and historical. The his toric·a1 dimension is Tillich's 
33~., PP• 12-15. 
34Ibid., p. 15. 
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concern in Part V of his Systematic Theolo&, "History and the 
Kingdom of God." It is the spiritual dimension, however, which 
is Tillich's concern in Part IV. It is under this dimension 
that Tillich discusses the various ambiguities of life, offers 
his definition of religion and, in the second division of Part 
IV, analyzes the religious symbol of the Spirit as one of the 
three religious symbols for the unambiguous life, the one under 
the dimension of the spirit or under the spiritual dimension. 
Tillich defines "spirit" as the "unity of power and mean-
ing," "the unity of life-power and life in meanings."35 It is 
in terms of this power and meaning that Tillich analyzes the 
personal, interpersonal, and transpersonal structures of human 
existence. Tillich presents a brief etymology of the word 
"spirit," and some of its semantic problems for the contemporary, 
especially English speaking man. Yet, Tillich thinks a new 
understanding of the term "spirit" is a necessity. Other words 
to describe this "unity of power and meaning" dimension of 
life, such as soul, mind, reason, and intellect, tend to differ-
entiate man from the rest of nature, but at the expense of 
rationalizing, intellectualizing, or individualizing him.36 
Although Tillich's concern in Part IV is primarily with 
the spiritual dimension, what he says about it is often in terms 
of its relationship to the inorganic and organic dimensions. 
Remember that Tillich introduces Part IV of his Systematic 
35Ibid.' p. 22. 
3Gibid., pp. 21-4. 
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Theology by stating that theology "must relate its understanding 
-
of nature, for man is a part of nature and statements about 
nature underlie every statement about him."37 And, although 
Tillich's concept of life is not restricted to the organic 
dimensions, it is built upon it. "The organic dimension is 
characterized by self-related, self-preserving, self-increasing, 
and self-continuing Gestalten ('living wholes'). 11 38 It is 
upon this model of the organic dimension that Tillich bases his 
analysis of the spiritual dimension. ·This will be shown in the 
next chapter where Tillich's concept of the self-transcendence 
of life, as the fundamental characteristic of life, is analyzed. 
Tillich is concerned with the language he must use to speak 
about life, with the metaphors and imagery he will use to specify 
the proper object of his study. With the wrong metaphors at the 
beginning of his study, human life will be isolated within itself 
and in conflict with other dimensions of being. 
A Summary of Chapter One 
In Part IV of his Systematic Theology Paul Tillich is con-
cerned with ambiguous life and the quest for the unambiguous 
life under the dimension of the spirit. As we have seen, the· 
key words--how and why they are used--are of great importanc~ 
for Tillich's thought. So far we have looked at the words: 
life, dimension, and spiritual. Before we could analyze Tillich's 
37Ibid., P• 5. 
38~.' p. 20. 
29 
concept of life we first had to briefly define the terms which 
he uses in his basic definition of life:·being and non-being. 
We had to analyze especially Tillich's concept of non-being and, 
thereby, conclude that relative non-being for Tillich is poten-
tiality. Man threatened by his own unlimited potentiality. 
In reviewing some of Tillich's basic terminology in order 
to be able to understand his basic definition of life, we are 
confronted by a central question or problem which Tillich 
attempts to answer in his work: What are the creative limits 
for man's potentiality? What will keep man from tragic self-
destruction? It is this question of creative limits which 
Tillich attempts to answer in terms of the fundamental charac-
teristic of life, the self-transcendence of life. In chapter 
two of this paper the general concept of the self-transcendence 
of life will be analyzed. 
CHAPTER II 
THE GENERAL CONCEPr OF THE Shl.iF-TRANSCENDENCE OF LIFE 
Life is the "actualization of potential being. 111 This 
existential actualization is ambiguous. The ambiguity is in the 
fact that this actualization can be positive, creative, and 
"great," or negative, destructive and "tragic. 112 Tillich is 
faced with the problem-question: if the actualization of poten-
tial being is ambiguous, if it can be great or tragic, how can 
this ambiguity be resolved? How can this actualization of 
potential oeing be determined for the positive and against the 
negative? What limits can be set to provide for a creative 
actualization of potential being? 
·Hammond svates tliat Tillich in Part IV places importance 
upon the distinction between ambiguous and unambiguous life 
because life in growth or change is threatened with the loss 
of identity and especially because human activity may lead to 
"chaotic indeterminancy."3 Life as ambiguous is an existential 
question; life as unambiguous is an answer. Tillich is being 
faithful to his method of correlation: life as we experience it 
1Tillich, §_!, Vol. III, P• 30. 
2Ibid., P• 94. 
3Hammond, p. 100. 
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is problematic and questionable; answer and solution are theo-
logical tasks. The theological answer is in terms of Spirit, 
a symbol for Unambiguous life. Life without threat is the 
promise underlying Christian faith's response to a threatening 
situation. 
Transcendence and the Self-transcendence of Life 
Tillich's main concern in his existential consideration of 
life is the ambiguous nature of actualization, the threatening 
aspects of growth, change, self-preservation, and creativity. 
For Tillich, these growing, changing, self-preserving, creative 
aspects of life, these movements beyond, this actualization of 
potential being, are the transcending movements of life, the 
transcendence of life. 
Since Tillich's specific concern in Part IV is life in the 
spiri·tual dimension, liis concern with the transcendence of life 
in Part IV is primarily an analysis of human transcendence, or 
self-transcendence. For Tillich, the two principal moments of 
human self-transcendence are human knowledge and love. Tillich's 
analysis of the cognitive and moral activity of man, therefore, 
is his main means of considering the existential aspects of life: 
the ambiguity of human self-transcendence. 
At the end of his essential consideration of life, Tillich 
discusses the spiritual dimension's relationship to the dimen-
sions preceding it and upon which it is built. He cites two 
examples.to show the relationship: an analysis of the cognitive 
act and an analysis of the moral act. In discussing these two 
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central and fundamental acts of the spiritual dimension, Tillich 
reveals his basic use of the word "transcendence." 
First, Tillich gives his analysis of the cognitive act: 
The transcendence of the center over the psychological 
material makes the cognitive act possible, and such an 
act is a manifestation of spirit. We said that the 
personal center is not identical with any one of the 
psychological contents, but neither is it another ele-
ment added to them; if it were this, it would be psy-
chological material itself, and not the bearer of the 
spirit. Nor is the personal center strange to the 
psychological material. It is their psychological· 
center, but transformed into the dimension of the 
spirit. The psychological center, the subject of self-
awareness, moves in the realm of higher animal life as 
a balanced whole, organically or spontaneously (but not 
mechanically) dependent on the total situation. If the 
dimension of the spirit dominates a life process, the 
psychological center offers its own contents to the unity 
of the personal center. This happens through delibera-
tion and decision. In doing so it actualizes its own 
potentialities, but in actualizing its own potentiali-
ties, it transcends itself. This phenomena can be ex-
perienced in every cognitive act.4 
Secondly, Tillich gives his analysis of the moral act: 
Here also a large amount of material is present in 
the psychological center-drives, inclinations, more or 
less compulsory trends, moral experiences, ethical tra-
ditions and authorities, relations to other persons, 
social conditions. But the moral act is not the diag-
onal in which all these vectors limit each other and 
converge; it is the centered self which actualizes it-
self as a personal self by distinguishing, separating, 
rejecting, preferring, connecting, and in doing so, 
transcending its elements.~ 
In both of these brief analyses Tillich focuses upon that 
aspect of life which makes growth and "movement beyond" possible. 
This transcendence of life or, more specifically, the self-
4Tillich, ST, Vol. III, p. 27 (The underlining, except 
their, is not Tiilich's.) 
5Ibid., pp. 27-8 (The unde·rlining is not Tillich's). 
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transcendence of life in terms of human knowledge and morality, 
is not just one aspect among many aspects of life, but the fun-
damental characteristics of life. Hammond points this out and 
at the same time makes some distinctions which underlie Tillich's 
met.hodology in presenting his existential consideration of life. 
The power of life, finally, is the power of self-
transcendence! ••• Tillich at one point seeks to pre-
serve a distinction between that going out of itself 
which we have identified as the self-creativity of life 
and the function of self-transcendence as such. Accord-
ing to this distinction, creativity appears on the hori-
zontal level, while transcendence suggests that function 
of life whereby it rises above itself vertically in the 
direction of the infinite •••• Later, however, Tillich 
acknowledges that self-transcendence cannot be viewed 
as a separate function of life, but must be understood 
as an aspect or quality of the other functions {in human 
life, self-integration or morality as well as self-crea-
tion or culture.) For our purposes, therefore, self-
transcendence may be viewed as the most significant 
aspect of that going out of itself which constitutes 
life. It is to be found in all levels or "dimensions" 
of life but comes to its fullest realization in man •••• 
The power of self-transcendence can be identified 
as the power of being to overcome non-being.b 
This "going out of itself which constitutes life," ~elf­
transcendence, this "power of being to overcome non-being" is 
man's greatness and also his weakness. In his description of 
man's self-transcendence, Tillich's emphasis upon the tragic 
and negative is constant. The root problem is, as it was shown 
in the first chapter, the problem of relative non-being, the 
ambiguous actualization of human potentiality. The concept of 
non-being is central to Tillich's understanding of human self-
transcendence and especially to his emphasi ~~stl'f.?o~ ic 
and negative dimensions. As has been sta edvbef~~0whaf~ U LA \J'\ 
N/VERS/Ty 
(iaRARV 
6 ' 
Hammond, pp. 104-5. 
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Tillich described in more metaphysical terminology in the first 
three parts of his Systematic Theology, is again stated in 
Part IV but from a different vantage point and with different 
terminology. Yet the problem is the same: the threat of non-
being. Hammond points out this recurring concern in Tillich's 
thought. 
As the system develops, however, it becomes clear 
that Tillich's distinction is not so much between being 
and becoming as between "ambiguous" and "unambiguous" 
life. In the former, self-transcendence threatens the 
loss of self-id~ntity: creativity may lead to a chaotic 
indeterminancy. 'I 
But whether in terms of being, becoming, and the overcoming 
of non-being or in terms of ambiguous or unambiguous life, the 
emphasis upon risk, upon the ambiguity of the human situation, 
upon the tragic and negative is central and fundamental to 
Tillich's thought. Tillich states: 
The process of self-transcendence carries a double 
meaning in each of its moments. At one and the same 
time it is an increase and a decrease ·in the power of 
being.8 ••• in every act of human creativity the ele-
ment of separation from the creativ~ ground is effec-
tive. Human creation is ambiguous.~ 
And Hammond responds: 
In ·these statements as elsewhere Tillich is sug-
gesting that the basic movement of life contains both 
a positive and negative aspect. This means, in effect, 
that life is tragic. It becomes separated from its 
source and ground by its own greatness, its own self-
transcendence and creativity.10 
?Ibid., P• 100. 
8Tillich, _§!, Vol. II, p. 190. 
9~., P• 256. 
10 Hammond, p. 108. 
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In summary, human life is threatened by its own possibili-
ties. In transcending itself it. tends to lose itself. In moving 
beyond and forward it tends to lose its ground and its direction. 
In doing something new it tends to lose itself in novelty and 
strangeness. 
Two Corresponding Realities: A Schema 
I 
In order to better Understand Tillich's consideration of the 
ambiguity of human self-transcendence and what is needed to re-
solve this ambiguity, that is, in order to better understand 
his analyses of culture, morality, and religion (the main focuses 
in his existential consideration of life), a schema will be pre~_ 
sented which is a possible way of understanding the basic struc-
ture of Tillich's thought in these analyses. 
For Tillich, the self-transcendence of life is the funda-
mental characteristic·of life and it is in terms of this self-
transcendence that Tillich analyzes life's ambiguities. -cor-
responding to this self-transcendence of life and providing it 
with possible determination or limitation, is the experience of 
the transcendent. It is in terms of this experience of the 
transcendent that Tillich proposes a possible resolution to 
life's ambiguities. 
The self-transcendence of life means that life goes beyond 
itself. It states that life is "a centrally intended movement 
ahead, a going out from a center of action. 1111 The experience 
11Tillich, .2,!, Vol. III, P• 30. 
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of the transcendent states that there is a beyond, an ahead to 
which life moves, a goal or purpose. It states that life's 
movement is shaped, oriented, directed, defined, and limited 
by what is ahead and beyond. What can shape and orient life 
and ensure that its movement ahead will be creative and not 
destructive, can, for Tillich, be answered ultimately only in 
theological terms. But the possibility of an answer, a possible 
solution, is proposed by Tillich in his philosophical statement 
and analysis of the problem. 
For Tillich, the human experience of the transcendent is 
the experience of limitation, the experience of the limitations 
within which the actualization of human potentiality can be 
creative and great. This experience is expressed in such terms 
as the "beyond," "the not-me," "the other," "the divine within 
me." For Tillich the experience of limitation, or limits, is 
most profoundly realized in terms of moral obligation, demands 
of objective truth, and the religious language and symbols which 
point man to deeper dimensions within and outside of himself. 
Without this experience of limits, man forgets his own limited-
ness, and in doing so is threatened with his own potentiality. 
Hence there is a need for creative limits. 
To summarize, the self-transcendence of life is the ambi'""U-
ous going out of life beyond itself and the correlate experience 
of the transcendent is the experience of the limitation, limits, 
and limitedness within which this going· out can be rendered 
creative, positive, and "great." The self-transcendence of 
life is ambiguous, threatened with self-destructiveness and the 
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risk of tragedy when the actualization of potential being is· 
indeterminate, when life moves beyond itself without limits, or 
without proper and adequate limits. In other words, and .this 
will be seen in what follows, life is in need of limits, norms, 
values, criteria, absolutes. This is an abstract statement of 
the basic framework of Tillich's thought in Part IV of his 
Systematic Theology:. 
Tillich proceeds in his existential consideration of life 
by analyzing the three functions of life, the three aspects of 
the self-actualization of life (which in his analysis he cor-
relates to the three functions of the spirit: morality, culture, 
and religion): 1) self-integration where he specifically treats. 
morality in terms of the self-transcendence of life and the 
experience of the transcendent, 2) self-creativity where he 
specifically treats culture and in the same terms, and 3) the 
self~transcendence of "life where he treats religion and defines 
it in terms of a specific concept of self-transcendence and a 
specific experience of the transcendent. 
The three functions of life are all aspects of the self-
actualization of potential being. Self-transcendence applies to 
all three generally and in a specific sense to the third func-
tion of life. All three functions as seen under the spiritual 
dimension are "intended movements ahead," "goings out from a 
center." It is, however, in the third function of life that 
"life goes out of itself as finite life. 1112 The first two 
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functions remain within the limits of finite life. In the third 
function the limits of finite life are surpassed. In this func-
tion the experience of the transcendent is described in terms of 
the sublime, the infinite, the sacred, the holy--the vocabulary 
which Tillich uses to express the religious experience of the 
transcendent. 
Before the specific concept of the self-transcendence of 
life is considered and, with it, the religious experience of the 
transcendent, the general concepts of each should be considered 
as Tillich applies them to the first two functions of life. 
The First Function of Life: Self-integration 
The first function of life is the self-integration of life. 
In this function "centeredness is actualized. 1113 Not only is 
each function correlated to one of the functions of the spirit, 
for example, the function of self-integration to the function 
of morality, but each function is described in terms of the 
three polarities in the structure of existence: individualiza-
tion and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and des-
tiny .14 
The first function of life is described in terms of the 
polarity of individualization and participation. Given this 
polarity life in .the first function can disintegrate in one of 
l3Ibid., P• 31. 
14Tillich, ST, Vol. I, pp. 174-86. (Tillich treats these 
polarities in a section entitled,· 11The Ontological Elements." 
These elements are qualities, or tensions, in everything, pro-
viding Tillich with an ontological structure for systematic 
analysis of various topics.) 
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two directions. It can be too centered on the side of i'ndividu-
alization, or too dispersed on the side of participation. In 
either case, "the center is lost." To exemplify this, Tillich 
offers a critique of stimulus-response theories of life which 
"when raised to absolute validity ••• are not models of 
healthy life but of life in disintegration. 1115 Man as a mere 
reactor to outside stimuli loses his center and individuality. 
Impulsiveness displaces responsible activity. A moral center 
tends to be a useless category when man defines himself as 
determined, if not vlctimized, by a world of varied stimuli. 
Tillich's analysis of the first function of life, namely, 
self-integration, is made primarily in terms of the spiritual 
dimension and in this case in terms of morality, one of the 
three functions of the spirit. Tillich defines morality as 
"the function of life in which the centered self constitutes 
itself as a person." "Morality is the constitutive function 
of the spirit. 1116 In terms of self-transcendence it can be 
said that man transcends himself in such a way that the whole 
world is at his disposal or for his use. In this context there 
can be self-increasing and self-alteration. Man can assimilate 
all, he can incorporate all. Yet man experiences limitation 
and his limitedness. He experiences a something which tells 
him that the whole world is not at his disposal, or for his use. 
He experiences a true limit. This, for Tillich, is the beginning 
l5Tillich, §!, Vol. III, p. 35. 
16Ibid., p. 38. 
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of the moral experience, and the basis for true centeredness; 
the foundation of morality. To put it simply, man is faced 
with another person, another self, something not disposable, 
something not usabTe. Although the vocabulary is different, 
Tillich's thought here is quite similar to the thought of Martin 
Buber especially in terms of the latter's basic distinction 
between the I-Thou and the I-it. 17 It is in this basic exper-
ience of "person in encounter with other persons," that .Tillich 
attempts to ground the moral imperative, the foundations of 
demand, coI:1I11and, and the "ought-to-be." Tillich confronts 
pragmatic and utilitarian theories in terms of their inability 
to provide moral limits, that is, norms and absolutes • 
... 
Therefore, the other self as. the unconditional 
limit to the desire to assimilate one's whole world, 
and the experience of this limit is the experience of 
the ought-to-be, the moral imperative. The moral con-
stitution of the self in the dimension of the spirit 
begins with this experience. Personal life emerges in 18 the encounter of ·person with person and in no other way. 
Tillich states very succinctly the problem-question ·in the 
first function of life in terms of the self-transcendence of 
lite and the experience of the transcendent: "We must choose 
between a consistent but self-limiting building up of our life 
and a breaking-through of as many limits as possible with a 
loss of consistency and.direction. 1119 
l?Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1958), translated by Ronald Smith. 
18Tillich, §.!, Vol. II, p. 40. 
l9Ibid., p. 42. 
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The Concept of Eros 
What Tillich is attempting to state in this part of his 
Systematic Theology about morality and love, and what he will 
attempt to state about culture and truth as he analyzes the 
second function of life is dependent upon an understanding of 
an important aspect of his thought which he refers to in Part 
IV but which he does not explicitly treat: the concept of ~· 
A brief analysis of this concept, based on sources other than 
Part IV of his Systematic Theology, will help to clarify and 
exemplify his thought at this point. It will also help to 
clarify some references he makes in Part IV to the previous 
parts of his Systematic Theology. 
Much of Tillich's understanding of human self-transcendence 
especially in regard to his understanding of human love, is in 
terms of his use of the concept of eros. As in many other 
aspects of his thought, the Greek philosophical background of 
his thinking is quite apparent. For Tillich, ~ as defined 
by Plato, is the drive for the good and the true. Tillich's 
use of this concept of ~ is fundamental not only to his 
understanding of love, but to his epistemology. Tillich de-
scribes his basic understanding of ~· 
.JZos--a word which is not used by biblical reli-
~ion--intui ts the universals, the eternal essences 
(ideas), of which the concrete is only a weak imita-
tion. ~os drives beyond the individual things and 
persons. It uses the concrete as a starting point. 
But then it transcends it and dissolves it into the 
universal. The fulfillment of eros is the mystical 
union with the one, in which all concreteness has 
.... 
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disappeared. 20 
Statements such as this cause Hamilton to call Tillich an essen-
tialist in the Greek tradition and to deny Tillich the title of 
existentialist. Tillich, however, attempts to qualify such 
statements and, thereby, to avoid essentialism and the submer-
gence of the individual and the person. 
In describing human love, Tillich ·often contrasts the 
concept of eros with the concept of agape. It is with his use 
of the concept of agape, concrete love, that Tillich attempts 
to resist a degradation of the individual and of the particu-
lar in favor of the universal and essential. Agape puts the 
focus upon the particular and individual. Agape is Christian-
ity's major contribution to the tradition of Western thought; 
Christian agape refuses to allow man to escape into the safety 
and security of any essentialism. Tillich, the Christian, the 
existentialist, attempts to favor the concrete, the individual, 
and the particular. Whether his attempt is successful or not 
is questionable. His claim to be an existentialist is contested. 
One may ask: In making self-realization the ultimate 
criterion, by defining love as the power of being toward 
self-realization and the overcoming of self-destruction 
does Tillich not inadvertently elevate the eros concept 
over the others? Does he not incorporate the other as-
pects of love into the eros aspects? Is it not Plato's 
eros, which seeks fulfillment through the self-realiza-
tion of the individual (strengthened through the romantic 
ideal of the individual personality), which determines 
the temper and structure of Tillich's thought? His com-
mitment to eros accounts for the intuition of being in 
its rational form, as we find it in Tillich's writing, 
20Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ulti-
mate Realitv (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 50. 
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and for the characteristic inner dynamics of each of his 
concepts, as well as for the emphasis on the creative 
act, the dynamic union of the ultimate ground and the 
self-objectivating form, as the redeeming act of the 
spirit.21 . 
~ as the d~ive for the good and true parallels Tillich's 
basic description of self-transcendence. Also with this concept 
he criticizes the negative and tragic dimensions of human self-
transcendence. Again, he is taking a critical stance in regards 
to man's potentiality, his non-being. His fear is still the 
fear of the risky not-yet. 
He is critical of human pride and concupiscence. Both are 
self-destructive perversions of man's ~' of his potentiality. 
In attacking both, he is concerned with the creative limit or 
form for human potentiality. The quest is for man's possible 
resistance to non-being. Pride and concupiscence are both per-
verse in that man forsakes his creative limits, the possibilities 
for t~ue human knowledge and love, and instead makes himself the 
only center and limit. This can be done only at the price of 
eventual tragedy and self-destruction. 
The great risk of self-transcendence or self-affirmation 
is that man as proud removes himself from his divine center, 
his only salvation, and makes himself the·center. The tragedy 
of human existence is that in seeking the whole and center, 
man is separated from the whole and center. As concupiscent, 
man "desires to draw the whole of reality to self."22 For 
21Walter Leibrecht, "Life and Mind of Paul Tillich," Reli-
~ion and Culture, ed. by w. Leibrecht (New York: Harper ancr---
rothers, 1959), p. 26. 
22Tillich, §!, Vol. II, p. 52. 
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Tillich, the tragic and self-destructive dimensions of hi.Iman 
existence are most apparent historically in terms of arbitrary 
choices and subjective delusions. Ul~imately, the tragedy of 
human life is the perversion of knowledge and love. History is 
often a record of these destructive and self-destructive perver-
sities. 
Tillich sees in Freud's concept of the Libido and in 
Nietzsche's concept of the "will to power" profound analyses 
of the tragic dimensions of human self-transcendence. 23 In 
both these concepts he sees analyses of what he calls "exis-
tential concupiscence" or "distorted eros." Freud's Libido 
wants its own pleasure, not the other, as an object of love; 
it is never satisfied. Nietzsche's will to power is also an 
infinite never-satisfied drive. As Nietzsche's "will to power" 
leads to self-negation so Freud's Libido leads to the death-
wish. Without definite aim, or content, without limit or object, 
both Libido and "will to power" like non-being, are tragic and 
self-destructive. Potentiality without limit or without the 
correct limits is tragic. To be creative non-being needs form 
and limit, goal and aim. To be knowledge and love, there must 
be the definite, determining other, an object to know or love. 
In both cases it is the infinite, never satisfied 
drive which leads to self-negation. Nietzsche tries to 
overcome this trend by emphatically proclaiming a courage 
which takes the negativities of being into itself. In 
this he is influenced by Stoicism and Protestantism. 
But, in contrast to both of them, he does not show the 
norms and principles by which the will to power can be 
23Ibid., pp. 53-55. 
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judged. It remains unlimited and has demonic-destructive 
traits~ It is another concept and symbol of concupis-
cence.c4 
Yet Tillich's attack/is not against concupiscence, which is 
the structure of human striving and drive. The attack is against 
distorted or existential concupiscence, that striving and drive 
under the conditions of existence, which is separated and 
"fallen" from the divine center. For Tillich, Freud and Nietzsche 
are wrong for identifying the existential with the essential and 
for accepting the distortion as the only reality. Tillich's 
criticism of Freud and Nietzsche for accepting the existential 
as the only reality is a concrete expression of his basic apolo-
getics. For Christian Tillich, sin and estrangement are not 
ultimate and final, but correction, redirection and redemption 
are possible. 
But like Freud's "Libido," Nietzsche's "will to 
power" is also blurred if described in such a way that 
the distinction between man's essential self-affirmation 
and his existential striving for power of being without 
limit is not clearly established.25 
Like his mentor, Plato, Tillich is in search of form. It 
is Tillich who states that "life meets the threat of growth by 
creating forms of growth. 1126 Human self-transcendence, if it 
is to overcome the threat of self-loss and self-destruction, if 
it is to find fulfillment in terms of knowledge and love, ne€ Ls 
direction and limitation. The threat of non-being, the risk of 
24Ibid., P• 55. 
25~. 
26Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1954), p. 54. 
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human potentiality, can only be overcome if human self-transcen-
dence comes to terms with the definite and objective other which 
is the antidote for the arbitrary and subjective. Human eros 
----
can find fulfillment with the limitations and objective concerns 
provided by the Christian's agape. Agape with its focus upon 
the concrete and individual, upon the particular here-and-now 
can give form to an ~ in need of limits. Without such limits 
the drive is fatal and self-destructive. Tillich states: It is 
the Christian concept of agape "which makes the cultural eros 
responsible and the mystical~ personal. 1127 This responsi-
bility of the cultural ~ is central to his analysis of the 
second function of life, namely, self-creativity. 28 
This brief analysis of ~' of its distortions in terms 
of pride and concupiscence, and of a possible remedy for these 
distortions in terms of agape, clarifies and exemplifies the 
basic· framework of Tillich's thought in his analysis of life: 
Life which is indeterminate and without proper limits is-threa-
tened with its own potentiality. This brief analysis also 
27ill£., p. 118. 
28rn his Love Power and Justice, Tillich attempts to show 
the importance of £fie concept of person and the personal for 
Christian faith and theology by his analysis of a~ape. He com-
pares the personal aspects of Christianity with t e impersonal 
aspects of other religions. He does this especially in some of 
his later works where he shows a great interest in a comparison 
of Christianity with eastern religions. He thinks that Chris-
tianity's personalism (which has so shaped Western thought) and 
the ~st's impersonalism can find a synthesis in the transpersonal. 
In his Christianitv and the .&icounter of World Reli ions 
(New York: Co um ia University Press, 1 3 , illich states that 
contemporary man will be more comfortable in his God-talk when 
it is put into transpersonal terms. This is reflected in Til-
lich's own vocabulary for God: The Unconditional, The Absolute, 
The Ground and Abyss of Being. 
4? 
provides a good introduction to understanding what is the cen-
tral concern in Tillich's analysis of the second function of 
life: the responsibility of the cultural eros. 
The Second Function of Life: 
Self-Creativity 
The second function of life in Tillich's existential con-
sideration of life is the function of self-creativity. Tillich 
analyzes this function in terms of the second polarity in the 
structure of being: Dynamics and form. In this function, self-
al teration is emphasized, new centers are produced. Tillich is 
concerned with growth and, especially under the dimension of 
the spirit, culture. Again, the analysis ot this function can 
be made in terms of the self-transcendence of life and the 
experience of the transcendent. Tillich is concerned with self-
transcendence as the cultural activity of man. He is concerned 
with the experience of the transcendent as the norms and values 
which can determine cultural activity as creative, and not as 
destructive. 29 
To summarize, power or dynamics in terms of man's cultural 
activity is ambiguous and in need of norms and values; otherwise 
life is chaotic and tragic. In his consideration of the second 
function of life, Tillich attempts to refute cultural relativism 
and to confront humanism. In doing the latter he must turn to 
29Tillich is concerned with a need for absolutes. This is 
quite evident in his [;Jt Search for Absolutes (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1967), \:/ere Tillich investigates the destructive 
tendencies of various relativistic approaches to truth, moral 
decision, and the experience of the holy in religious experience. 
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the third function of life: religion. 
Culture, etymologically defined is: "Culture - is that 
which takes care of something, keeps it alive, makes it grow."30 
"• •• Culture creates something new beyond the encountered 
reality.n3l The ambiguity of culture is that human activity 
can be creative or chaotically destructive. The ambiguity, 
in other words is that the "new, " the '~novel n can be either 
opportunity or threat. Again, for Tillich, the question is: 
what can determine it to be one and not the other. Again, the 
possible answer is in terms of defined limits, in this case, 
in terms of forms or cultural values and absolutes. 
In attempting to analyze cultural activity Tillich focuses 
upon language as a primary cultural vehicle. In language, 
meaning is created. Through the word, "something new beyond 
encountered reality is created." Tillich's critique of lan-
guage ~xemplifies his general critique of culture.32 
Tillich speaks eloquently of the fundamental ambiguity of 
language. 
The inherent ambiguity of language is that in 
transforming reality into meaning it separates mind 
and reality. Countless examples could be given, but 
one can distinguish the following main kinds of ambi-
guity of the word: the poverty in the midst of richness 
that falsifies that which is grasped through neglect 
30Tillich, §!, Vol. III, p. 57. 
31~. 
32since so much of contemporary philosophical and theologi-
cal writing is concerned with the function and use of language 
as a primary expressive and creative tool in human experience, 
Tillich's emphasis upon the role of language in cultural growth 
and especially in theological development makes him particularly 
appealing to contemporary readers. 
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of innumerable other possibilities; the limitation on 
universality imposed by expressing definite encounter 
with reality in a particular structure that is strange 
to other linguistic structures and the indefiniteness 
within definite meaning that leads to the betrayal o.f 
the mind by words, the ultimately uncommunicative 
character of this main tool of communication as a result 
of the unintended as well as intended connotation in 
the self of the centered person; the unlimited charac-
ter of the freedom of language when limitations by per-
sons or objects are rejected, the empty talk and reac-
tion against it, the flight into silence; the nanipula-
tion of language for the sake of purposes with no basis 
in reality such as flattery, polemics, intoxication, 
propaganda; and finally, the perversion of language to 
the exact opposite of the function intended by the self-
creative power of life through hiding, distorting and 
contradicting that which it is supposed to present.33 
As with language, so it is with culture for Tillich! Both 
the use of language and cultural activity can be destructive in 
one of two ways: a relativism which renders power formless and 
valueless or a formalism in which power is encumbered and re-
stricted by forms. In either case, what could have been self-
creative becomes self-destructive. 
Just as the experience of the "other self" or "otheI_' person" 
is the beginning of the moral experience, that is, the experience 
of a true limit for man's basically unlimited power to assimilate 
all and to dispose of all; and just as this experience of the 
moral transcendent is the possibility and demand for love, so 
the experience of the cognitive other, "the definite object," 
is the beginning of the cognitive experience and the possibility 
and demand for truth. In terms of the polarity of dynamics and 
form, Tillich analyzes the cognitive act as he speaks of the 
33Tillich, §!, Vol. III, P• 69. 
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basic subject-object split in all knowledge.34 Tillich attempts 
to provide a framework out of which he can describe the cogni-
tive act without falling into either an objectless subjectivism 
or a subjectless objectivism. The unlimited, or infinite power 
of the subject to know is limited by the form or facticite of 
the world to be encountered. Subjectivism or objectivism is 
ultimately destructive of truth.35 
The ambiguities of the cognitive act of the self-
creation of life are rooted in the split between sub-ject and object. This split is the precondition of all 
knowledge and, at the same time, the negative power in 
all knowledge. The whole history of epistemology is a 
cognitive attempt to bridge this split by showing the 
ultimate unity of subject ~nd object, either by anni-
hilating one side of the gap for the sake of the other 
or by establishing a uniting principle which contains 
both of them.36 
As Tillich considers the cognitive aspect of the self-creative 
function, in like manner he considers the aesthetic act and its 
ambiguity. 
In artistic intuition and its images, a reunion or 
theoria and reality, which otherwise could not be reached, 
is believed possible. But the aesthetic image is no 
less ambiguous than the cognitive concept and the 
34This subject-object split is overcome in mystical know-
ledge. For Tillich, highpoints in religious experience are those 
ecstatic moments when the oneness of everything is glimpsed. 
This is one of the reasons that Tillich had a special interest 
in Western as well as Eastern mysticism. 
35For Tillich knowledge is rooted in the basic intentioL· 
ality of man. The subject-object split is grounded in what Mer-
leau-Ponty refers to as the primordial unity of man-world. Both 
objectivist and subjectivist theories of truth neglect the origi-
nal unity of man-world. This approach to intentionality is well 
summarized in Merleau-Ponty's preface to his Phenomenology of 
Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. xvii-xxi. 
36Tillich, §!, Vol. III, p. ?O. 
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grasping word. In the aesthetic function the gap 
between expression and that which is expressed repre-
sents the split between the acts of theoria and encoun-
tered reality. The ambiguities resulting from this 
split can be shown in the conflict of stylistic ele-
ments which characterize every work of art - and 
indirectly, every aesthetic encounter with reality.37 
Language, the cognitive function, and the aesthetic func-
tion provide for Tillich examples of the self-creative function 
of life. Indeed his consideration of them demonstrates his 
analysis of this second function of life in terms of the self-
transcendence of life and the experience of the transcendent. 
A Criticism of Humanism 
Tillich concludes his consideration of the second function 
. of life and specifically his critique·of man's cultural activity 
by offering a criticism of humanism. This conclusion provides 
him with a logical point of departure for his consideration of 
religion, the third function of the spirit and the self-trans-
cendence of life defined in a specific way. 
For Tillich, the root idea of humanism is that "only in 
man does the universe reach up to an anticipatory and fragmen-
tary fulfillment. 11 38 Yet Tillich has difficulties with human-
ism's attempt to provide norms and values either for morality 
or culture. "The ambiguities of humanism are based on the fact 
that as humanism, it disregards the self-transcending function 
of life and absolutizes the self-creative function."39 
3?Ibid., p. ?2 • 
............. 
38Ibid., p. 85. 
39Ibid. 
~
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Here Tillich is referring to the specific concept of the 
self-transcendence of life, that is, finite life transcending 
itself as finite. For humanism, man is the ultimate norm, the 
final criterion, his own limit. According to humanism, religion 
is one of the many cultural creations of man. "Humanism actu-
ally denies the self-transcendence of life and with it the 
innermost character of religion. 1140 
Man cannot be his own norm. Man's ultimate experience of 
the transcendent must not be man or humanity, not an experience 
of self-limitation. For Tillich, religion offers man the pos-
sibility of a self-transcendence beyond finite life itself and 
the possibility of the experience of ultimate limitations and 
limitedness, ultimate otherness, the ultimate source of values 
and norms, the absolute ground of truth and love. Religion 
offers man an experience of the holy. Humanism is restrictive 
and reductive; it "fails to consider the human predicament and 
its existential estrangement. 1141 Religion provides a higher 
criticism whereas humanism allows man to become too easily a 
victim of his own self-delusions and illusions. Religion pro-
Vides substance for culture and an unconditional character for 
morality. For Tillich humanism's universe is still only "frag-
mentary and anticipatory." Religion offers depth, something 
that makes the fragmentary acceptable and the anticipatory 
worthwhile. 
4oibid. 
41Ibid., p. 86. 
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In summary, religion is necessary because man left to 
himself is too easily victimized by what is superficial and 
false, by what is, for the moment at least, attractive and 
seemingly true and beneficial. Religion is necessary becau~e 
man, despite his estrangement, has glimpses and hints of 
dimensions of life which are unfathomable and mysterious. 
Religion is necessary for Tillich because man should never be 
too sure who he is and where he is going. For Tillich, 'life as 
being is mystery. Humanism is quick to make man ultimate and 
normative and remove the mystery. In other words and in a more 
concrete way, Tillich states that ordinary language is not able 
to open the depths of culture and ensure the unconditional 
character of morality. With religious language and symbolism, 
man's self~integration and self-creation is deepened, evaluated, 
directed, judged and grounded. In other words, religion offers 
man the possibility of the experience of the holy, the experience 
of God, the ultimate ground of being and meaning. Without reli-
gion as the self-transcendence of life and without the religious 
experience of the Transcendent, culture loses its depth and 
morality its.unconditional character. 
A Summary 
In chapter one Tillich's essential consideration of life 
was analyzed. His definition of life used terms which, according 
to the way Tillich defined them, indicated a fundamental frame-
work in Tillich's thought; pot~ntiality, if it is to be actual-
ized in a creative and non-destructive way, needs proper limits. 
~ 
In chapter two Tillich's existential consideration of life 
was analyzed: Life is ambiguous because it can go either way; 
it can be creative and great, or it can be self-destructive and 
tragic. I! life is to be creative and great, it needs deter-
mination, or limits. In chapter two the first two functions of 
life were analyzed: Self-integration and self-creativity. In 
analyzing the first function of life, Tillich focused especially 
upon morality and in analyzing the second function he was 
especially concerned with culture. 
To better understand his analyses, a schema of two corres-
ponding realities was pointed out to clarify the fundamental 
structure of his existential consideration of life: l) the 
self-transcendence.of life, the fundamental characteristic of 
life, and 2) the experience of the transcendent, the experience 
of limitation or limits. A brief analysis of Tillich's concepts 
of~ and agape was·presented to clarify and exemplify these 
two corresponding realities as a fundamental structure in his 
thought. 
Finally, Tillich's criticism of humanism was analyzed since 
in this criticism Tillich states the need for religion if 
morality is not to lose its unconditional·character and culture 
its depth. 
In chapter three, Tillich's consideration of the third 
function of life will be analyzed: the self-transcendence of 
life. Tillich defines religion as the self-transcendence of 
life under the dimension of the spirit. This definition will 
be analyzed and, again, the schema of two corresponding 
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realities will provide the basic structure for the analysis: 
the self-transcendence of life, Tillich's definition of 
religion, and the experience of the transcendent, religiously 
expressed as the experience of the holy. 
CHAPrER III 
THE SPECIFIC CONCEPr OF THE SELF-TRANSCENDENCE OF LIFE 
In terms of the self-transcendence of life and the exper-
ience of the transcendent, specifically in terms of the polarity 
of individualization and participation, Tillich considered the 
first function of life, self-integration. Morality was the 
primary object of this consideration. Tillich was faced with 
the problem-question of limits--moral norms--what could provide 
life's ambiguity with the possibility of some resolution, some 
positive determination. 
In terms of the self-transcendence of life and the exper-
ience of the transcendent but specifically in terms of the 
polarity of dynamics and form Tillich considered the second 
function of life, self-creativity. Culture was the primary 
object of this consideration. Tillich was faced again with 
the problem-question of limits--cultural values--again, what 
could provide life's ambiguity with the possibility of some 
resolution, some positive determination. 
In both cases, without these limits, life is indeterminate 
and chaotic. It is faced with the threat of self-disintegration, 
the risk of self-destruction. In both cases life is ambiguous. 
In his considerations of morality and culture Tillich discusses 
the possibility of limits, norms, and values, yet in neither 
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case is Tillich completely satisfied with the possible answers, 
the possible limits. 
The Third Function of Life: Self-transcendence 
In his consideration of the third function of life, the 
self-transcendence of life, Tillich's primary object of consi-
deration is religion. The basic structure of the self-transcen-
dence of life and of the experience of the transcendent is 
expressed in the third function in terms of the third polarity 
in the very structure of being, the polarity of freedom and 
destiny. Again, Tillich is faced with the problem-question of 
limits--absolute norms and ultimate values. Morality and culture 
may pose questions and demand some attempt at answers, but it 
is religion which poses ultimate questions and the possibility 
of a final resolution to life's ambiguity, the ultimate and 
absolute positive determination. In his consideration of the 
third function of life, Tillich uses a specific concept of the 
self-transcendence of life, where "life moves beyond itself as 
finite ••• n1 Religion is concerned with life's ambiguity 
looking for-resolution in the infinite, the ultimate, the uncon-
ditional, the absolute, the eternal. For Tillich the religious 
experience of the transcendent is expressed and can be analyzed 
in terms of some traditional religious categories: the holy, 
the sacred, the mysterious, the other, the sublime. 
Tillich states that the movement for the third function of 
1Tillich, .§!, Vol. III, P• 31. 
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life is vertical. "Life drives beyond itself as finite life. 112 
Here life is "driving toward the sublime."3 "The words 'sub-
lime,' 'sublimation,' 'sublimity,' point to a going beyond 
limits toward the great, the solemn, the high. 114 In the third 
function Tillich considers the supreme self-actualization of 
life. 
Life, in degrees is free fro.m its elf, from a total 
bondage to its own finitude. It is striving in the 
vertical direction toward ultimate and infinite being. 
The vertical transcends both the circular line of cen-
teredness and the horizontal line of growth.) 
Not only is the third flinction different from the previous two 
insofar as in this function life transcends itself as finite, 
but it is also different insofar as the specific self-transcen-
dence of life and the specific experience of the transcendent 
manifest themselves in a completely different way. Hence in 
the third function of life, the method of investigation is quite 
different. 
The question as to how the self ~transcendence of 
life manifests itself cannot be answered in empirical 
terms as is possible in the case of self-integration 
and self-creativity. One can speak about it only in 
terms which describe the reflection of the inner self-
transcendence of things in man's consciousness. Man 
is the.mirror in which the relation of everything 
finite to the infinite becomes conscious. No empiri-
cal observation of this relation is possible, because 
all empirical knowledge refers to finite interdepen-
dences, not to the relation of the finite to the in-
finite.6 
2rbid. 
-3~. 
4 Ibid. 
5rbid., p. 56. 
6~., p. 8?. [Obviously, Tillich is opposed to those 
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Because Tillich's methodology is phenomenological, that is 
an analysis of what appears in human consciousness, his consi-
deration of religion and the religious dimension of man·is 
directed at religious symbols and language, images and mythic 
structures. According to Tillich, by anlyzing and interpreting 
man's religious symbols and metaphors one can approach what is 
reflected in the mirror of human consciousness. \t/hat is reflec-
ted in the mirror of human consciousness and necessarily ex-
pressed symbolically and metaphorically is the religious exper-
ience of the transcendent, ~he sublime, or, as Tillich more 
traditionally states it, the experience of the holy. In analyz-
ing this experience of tne holy Tillich attempts his analysis 
of the third function of life and provides the foundations for 
his philosophical understanding of religion and the religious 
dimension of man. 
The .Experience of the Holy 
According to Tillich, the experience of the holy is not 
the experience of any particular object arising in conscious-
ness. He is not interested in finding ! god or any other con-
crete holy being. For Tillich a definition of what is funda-
mentally infinite is a contradiction in terms and the beginning 
of the end to any experience of the holy, the beginning of 
positivistic and empiricist theories of knowledge which hold 
that man can know only what is quantified and measurable. 
There are aspects of human consciousness which a strictly 
scientific model of investigation cannot cope with.] · 
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superstitious and false limits. Instead, the experien¢e of· the 
holy is a way of experiencing the objects that do arise in 
consciousness; it is a way of experiencing life and being. 
The experience of the holy is qualitative. 
This distinction is crucial for an understanding of 
Tillich's approach to religion and God and especially his analy-
sis of religious language and symbolism. In his many attempts 
to interpret religious language and speech, Tillich often 
directs his thought against objectivist and literalist inter-
pretations of the symbolic and metaphorical. He is a demytholo-
gizer, if myth is defined as man's attempt to objectify, reify, 
personify, and quantify qualitative aspects within human sub-
jectivity. 
For Tillich, to experience something in a holy way is to 
experience its greatness and its dignity, whether that something 
be some concrete object or whether that something be life 
itself, reality itself, or being itself. Religious speech is 
really concerned with attitude; its referent is not a "what" 
but a "how." 
The experience of the holy is the experience of greatness: 
The greatness of life in the sense of self-trans-
cendence is qualitative. The great in the qualitative 
sense shows a power of being and meaning that makes it 
a representative of ultimate being and meaning and gives 
it a dignity of such representation.7 
Such an understanding presupposes a particular metaphysical 
approach to reality, which on the philosophical level can be 
? . Ibid., p. 88. 
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described as a participation theory of being and on the theologi-
cal level can be described as sacramental. Whatever is exper-
ienced as holy is experienced as pointing to deeper meaning 
and being. 
To experience something as holy is not only to experience 
its greatness but also its dignity. Dignity signifies inviola-
bility. From the inorganic to spiritual dimension, the dignity 
of whatever is experienced is set against its possible violabil-
ity, its possible exploitation. Tillich's thought at this 
point is again quite similar to the thought of Martin Buber 
who expresses this distinction. in terms of his famed I-Thou 
and I-It distinction as ways of experiencing anything.8 Like 
Buber, Tillich offers some cautious criticism of technology and, 
in terms of this aspect of the experience of the holy, describes 
how religion ideally functions to protect the inviolability 
of all things.~ 
The self-transcendence of life in the specific sense is 
concerned with life moving beyond itself as finite. The exper-
ience of the transcendent at this point is the experience of 
the holy, the experience of greatness and dignity. Opposed to 
the self-transcendence of life is the profanization of life 
and opposed to the holy is the profane. 
8Buber, I and Thou. 
9Tillich, ST, Vol. III, p. 90. [For example, as an his-
torian of religIOns, Tillich comments "how polytheism often did 
a better job in this regard than did monotheism. The one God 
has the tendency to deprive all things of their dignity andj 
therefore, rob reality of the very thing it should protect. 
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The Profane, The Holy, and the Demonic 
The profane resists the holy. What is experienced as 
profane is experienced as not representative, as "shallow," as 
not pointing to any deeper or ultimate being or meaning. It 
is experienced as disposable, usable, violable. The profane 
bespeaks the smallness of violability of all things, of life 
and reality in general. 
Not only is the holy opposed by the profane from one dir-
ection, but it is also opposed from the opposite direction. 
Here Tillich adds a third key word to his basic vocabulary 
for an analysis of religion: the demonic. The demonic does not 
resist the holy, it distorts the holy by claiming for some 
particular thing the ultimacy and depth to which the particular 
should point. The demonic is the idolatrous, the deified. 
This profane-holy-demonic model especially in terms of the 
greatness of life, provides Tillich with a methodological struc-
ture for a critical understanding and evaluation of religion and 
the religions of man. From one direction the holy is resisted 
by the profane and the greatness of life is reduced to small-
ness. From the other direction the holy is distorted by the 
demonic and the greatness of life is disfigured and becomes the 
tragedy of life. 
From one direction greatness becomes smallness: 
Only smallness, the fear of reaching beyond one's 
finitude, the readiness to accept the finite because 
it is given, the tendency to keep vne's self within 
the limits of the ordinary, the average existence and 
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its security--only smallness radically conflicts with 
the greatness and dignity of life.10 · 
The smallness of life is the radical profanization of life. 
Life· is not experienced as holy. As with the other experiences 
of the transcendent, the problem-question for Tillich is in 
terms of limits and limitations. The profane is a matter of 
false limits; it is restrictive and demeaning. It is a matter 
of over-limitation, a too-limited experience of life. This 
radical profanization of life, according to Tillich, is mani-
fested in various empirical and positivist theories of moral 
value. In both cases, according to Tillich, what can be great 
is made small, if not petty and trivial. 
From the other direction greatness becomes tragedy: 
The classical example is the Greek hero, who 
represents the highest power and value within the 
group to which he belongs. Through his greatness 
he comes near to the divine sphere in which the 
fulfillment of being and meaning is seen in divine 
figures. But if he trespasses the limits of his 
finitude, he is thrown back upon it by the "anger _ 
of the gods." Greatness implies risk and the will- 11 ingness of the great to take tragedy upon themselves. 
If one asks what the guilt of the tragic hero is, 
the answer must be that he perverts the function of 
self-transcendence by identifying himself with that 
to which self-transcendence is directed--the great 
itself. He does not resist the demand to transcend 
his own greatness. He is caught by his own pQwer of 
representing the self-transcendence· of life.12 
The tragic is the elevation of something beyond its proper 
limits. Again, Tillich is faced with the problem-question of 
lOibid., p. 88. 
-
llill,9;. 
12
:tbid., P• 94. 
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transcendence, the experience of limitation and limitedness. 
·Whereas the smallness of life is a matter of over-limitation 
and restriction, the tragedy of life is a matter of non-limita-
tion; the finite identifies itself with the infinite. It is 
not a matter of restriction but a matter of arrogance. The 
demonic distorts the holy; idolatry exemplifies this. Til-
lich's criticism of the tragic hero is similar to his criticism 
of humanism. Man becomes his own experience of transcendence. 
He becomes his own norm and source 0£ value. Self-criticism 
is the only criticism left to him. 
It can be stated at this point quite simply what is the 
ambiguity of life for the third function of life: To avoid the 
smallness of life, greatness must be attempted with the risk 
of tragedy. The great stands between the small and the tragic, 
between restriction and arrogance. In other words, the subhuman 
and the superhuman are both inhuman. 
The religious experience of the transcendent, the exper-
ience of the holy as the experience of ultimate limitation 
and limitedness, is the possibility of a solution-answer to the 
problem-question posed by the ambiguity of life. For Tillich, 
man attempts to express, communicate, and even create the 
experience of the holy (the experience of the greatness and 
dignity of the mystery of life) with the things of religion: 
religious language and symbolism, ritual and liturgy, prophets 
and saints. With religion man can cotinteract his tendency to 
restrict life and make himself small. Religion and the things 
of religion can excite his imagination and focus his attention 
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upon the dpeth and richness of being. It can recreate a hope-
less situation. Religion can offer promise in the face of 
despair. 
With religion man can also counteract his tendency to live 
his life arbitrarily, i.e., without the norms and values which 
can protect him, his neighbor, and his world from the tragedy of 
unlimited power. Religion can accuse man when he tends to be 
presumptuous. Yith the things of religion man has the possi-
bility of experiencing the holy, that is, the ultimacy, serious-
ness, and depth which can keep life great and dignified. With 
religion man can protect himself from himself; religion as 
ultimate promise and accusation provides man with the critical 
insights necessary to judge and appreciate his cultural activ-
ity and moral responsibility. 
Religion, Culture, and Morality 
Tillich's philosophy of religion attempts to avoid-isolat-
ing religion and the religious dimension of man. Just as he 
refused to use the metaphor of "level" when speaking of life in 
order to avoid certain unnecessary discontinuities, so Tillich 
refuses to discuss religion as separate from culture and moral-
ity. The three interpenetrate in the spiritual dimension. 
In accordance with their essential nature, 
morality, culture, and religion interpenetrate one 
another. They constitute the unity of the spirit, 
wherein the elements are distinguishable but not 
separable.13 
l3lbid.' p. 95. 
-
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Tillich defined morality as "the constitution of the person 
in the encounter with other persons. 1114 Morality is related to 
cul tur.e: "Culture provides the content of morali ty--the concrete 
ideals of personality and community, and the changing laws of 
ethical wisdom. 1115 Morality is related to religion; "Religion 
gives to morality the unconditional character of the moral 
imperative, the ultimate moral aim. 16 · 
Tillich briefly states the relationship of the three func-
tions of the spirit from the viewpoint of culture: 
Culture, or the creation of a universe of meaning 
in theoria and praxis, is essentially related to moral-
ity and religion. The validity of cultural creativity 
in all its functions is based on the person-to-person 
encounter in which limits to arbitrariness are estab-
lished. without the force of t~e moral imperative, no 
demand coming from the logical, aesthetic, personal, 
and communal forms could be felt. The religious ele-
ment in culture is the inexhaustible depth of a genuine 
creation. One may call it substance or the ground from 
~hich culture lives. It is the element of ultimacy 17 which culture lacks in itself but to which it points. 
Tillich states the relationship between the three from a 
viewpoint of religion: 
Religion, or the self-transcendence of life under 
the dimension of the spirit, is essentially related to 
morality and culture. There is no self-transcendence 
under the dimension of the spirit without the consti-
tution of the moral self by the unconditional impera-
tive, and this self-transcendence cannot take form 
except within the universe of meaning created in the 
cultural act.18 
14Ibid., P• 95. 
l5Ibid. 
16Ibid. 
17~. 
18Ibid. 
-
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According to Tillich religion, morality, and cultlire have 
an essential unity. Religion, ·essentially stated, is a "quality 
of the two other functions of the spirit and not an independent 
func.tion. ul9 Tillich's definition of religion as the self-
transcendence of life under the dimension of the spirit "makes 
the image of the essential unity of religion with morality 
and culture possible •••• 1120 "The self-transcendence of life 
is effective in the unconditional character of the moral act 
and in the exhaustible depth of meaning in all meaning created 
by culture. 1121 But existentially speaking, religion becomes an 
independent function. It is not just a quality of the other two. 
It has its own proper role and task, often in conflict existen-. 
tially with culture and morality. "The three functions of life. 
under the dimension of spirit separate in order to become 
actual. 1122 
· As actual and independent, morality and culture separated 
from religion tend toward profanization or demonization. Accord-
ing to Tillich, morality as existentially separated from reli-
gion, loses its unconditional character. Religion provides the 
ground for moral responsibility. As Tillich rejected humanism 
for being incomplete, so he rejects secularism. "Morality and 
culture in existential separation from religion become what is 
usually called 'secular•.n23 Culture, as existentially separated 
l9Ibid., P• 96. 
20Ibid. 
21~. 
22~.' p. 95. 
23~., P• 97. 
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from religion, loses its ultimate character, its depth·. Re'li-
gion provides man with the experience of the holy which for 
Tillich, therefore, is most aptly described in terms of the 
ultimate and unconditional. The holy ultimately and uncondi-
tionally criticizes man's illusions, his reductionisms and his 
self-aggrandizements. Secular man stands ambiguously between 
smallness and tragedy; religion provides the possibility of an 
answer, a solution, a resolution, the possibility of unambigu-
ous life. 
The Ambiguity of Religion 
As independent, that is, as actual and not merely as 
essential, religi'on is in a state of ambiguity. Religion 
responds not without ambiguity to the secular situation. 
out of this situation religion arises as a special 
function of the spirit ••• Religion as the self-
transcendence or life needs the religions and needs 
to deny them. Basically they need to be denied because 
religion as a separate function shares a double ambigu-
ity •••• 1124 
In his analysis of religion, Tillich is faced with the relation-
ship of religion as a function of life to the many expressions 
of religion in time and space: the religions. Tillich is faced 
with "an interpretation of the history of religion. 1125 The 
religious self-transcendence of life and the religious exper-
ience of the transcendent are existentially and, therefore, 
ambiguously expressed in the religions. 
24Ibid. 
-25Ibid., PP• 94-5. 
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Tillich's interpretation of the history of religions is 
primarily made in terms of what he states is the "double am-
biguity" of religion. 
One can say that religion always moves between 
the danger points of profanization and demonization 
and that in every genuine act of the religious life 
both are present, openly or covertly.26 
Religion is profaned when it is just ~nother finite object, 
another cultural creation, just another institution or. organi-
zation! Religion is demonic when it elevates the conditional 
or finite to unconditional or infinite validity. Tillich exem-
plified this by a criticism of dogmas, doctrines, rituals, 
and churches which tend to absolutize themselves. 27 
,Tillich states that religion can profanize itself in two 
major ways: the institutional and the reductive. 
Instead of transcending the finite in the direc-
~ion of the infinite, institutional religion actually 
becomes a finite reality itself - a set of prescribed 
activities to be performed, a set of stated doctrines 
to be accepted, a social pressure group along with 
others, a political power with all the implications 
of power politics.28 
There is another, the "reductive" way, based on 
the fact that culture is the form of religion and 
that morality is the expression of its seriousness. 
This fact can lead to the reduction to culture or 
morality •••• 29 
26Tillich, .§!, Vol. III, p. 98. 
27Ibid., p. 1?6. CHere Tillich briefly mentions his 
famous-I5ro:testant principle, a needed ~rotest against this 
demonization tendency in all religion.J 
28~., PP• 99-100. 
29~., p. 100. 
?O 
In reaction to the ways that religion profanizes itself 
Tillich provides some definitions of religion more specific 
than his definition of religion as the self-transcendence of 
life under the dimensions of the spirit; he speaks of "the 
larger concept of religion as experience of the unconditional, 
both in the moral imperative and in the depth of culture."30 
Also in reaction to this profanization, Tillich defines religion 
in a way which sets forth his understanding of religion as 
existentially an independent function and essentially as not 
independent. 
Reductive profanization may succeed in abolish-
ing religion as a special function, but it is not 
able to remove religion as a quality that is found 
in all functions of the spirit--the quality of ulti-
'mate concern.31 · 
Ultimate concern is one of the most famous phrases from Til-
lich's vocabulary; his definition of faith and religion! Human-
ism and secularism are faced with religious issues, with reli-
gious question-problems, when they must concern themselves with 
the foundations for morality and culture, when they must find 
some answer-solution to the problem-question of life's ambiguity: 
What are the limits, the limitations within which and towards 
which life's movement can be creative and not ultimately self-
destructive? What are the possibilities for the unambiguous 
life? 
Tillich ends his treatment of religion as the self-
30ibid.' p.· 102. 
-31~. 
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transcendence of life under the dimension of the spirit by 
stating the fundamental ambiguity of religion. Religion is not 
the answer-solution to the question-problem posed by the ambigu-
ity of life. Religion is the possibility of an answer-solution: 
"for religion is the point at which the answer for the quest 
for the unambiguous life is received. 11 32 Religion is the point 
where the quest is most clearly evident. But religion is not 
revelation, as philosophy is not theology. In accordance with 
his basic method of correlation, that is, a correlation of 
philosophical question and theological answer, Tillich ends 
the first division of Pa.rt IV of his Systematic Theology by 
distinguishing religion,_ where the ultimate questions are 
directly asked and where the ultimate answers are received, 
from revelation, the "answer for the quest for the unambiguous 
life." 
If in religion, the great is called the holy, 
this indicates that religion is based on the manifes-
tation of the holy itself, the divine ground of being. 
~very religion is the receptive answer to revelatory 
experiences. This is the greatness and dignity.33 
Although religion and its expressions are holy, religion 
is not unambiguously holy, Religion is not revelation. Tillich 
regards this ambiguity of religion especially in regard to 
religion's relationship to the other two functions of the spirit. 
Religion in this respect (that is, the respect 
of man's possibility of receiving an answer) is unam-
biguous; the actual reception, however, is profoundly 
32Ibid., p. 104. 
33rbid., p. 99. 
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ambiguous, for it occurs in the changing forms or· man's 
moral and cultural existence. These forms participate 
in the holy to which they point, but they are not the 
holy itself. The claim to be the holy itself makes 
them demonic.34 
Religion is afflicted with this proround ambiguity and yet 
moral and cultural man cannot do without religion. "Religion 
is !!2! the answer to the quest for unambiguous life, although 
the answer can only be received through religion. 11 35 
A Summary 
In chapter three Tillich's definition of religion as the 
self-transcendence of life under the dimension of the spirit 
was analyzed. It was shown that his consideration of the third 
function of life and its ambiguity could be outlined in terms 
of two corresponding realities: 1) the self-transcendence of 
life specifically in the sense of life going outside of itself 
as finite and 2) the religious experience of the transcendent, 
the experience of the holy. 
In analyzing the experience of the holy and its distor-
tions, the profane and the demonic, Tillich once again indicated 
a central question or concern in his thought: a need for correct 
limits and determinations. The holiness of life without proper 
limits becomes the smallness of life and without limits at rll 
becomes the tragedy of life. 
For Tillich religion provides man with the possibility of 
34Ib.d 
__!_·' 
35Ibid. t 
-
p. 104. 
p. 106. 
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an experience of the holy. It is with religious language and 
symbolism that man attempts to express and communicate this 
profound experience. Yet religion cannot be a function separate 
from the other two functions of the spirit: culture and moral-
ity. Although inseparable from culture and morality, religion 
does have an independent function since morality tends to lose 
its unconditional character and culture tends to become shallow 
and lose its depth. Religion as the possibility of an exper-
ience of the holy provides man with the possibility of an un-
conditional, ultimate ground for moral and cultural norms and 
values. 
Religion is not the holy, but provides man with the possi-
bility of experiencing the holy and expressing it. Religion 
provides man with the ultimate questions, with the quest for 
unambiguous life. Religion like life itself is ambiguous. It 
often asks the wrong questions; it formulates its questions 
within some particular moral and cultural milieu, the received 
answer is never absolutely clear or infallible. Yet religion 
is where there is a possibility of receiving an answer. 
For Tillich, the answer itself is a matter of revelation. 
An analysis of the answer, in this case, an analysis of unam-
biguous life, is a theological task. This is the task Tillich 
sets before himself in the second section of Part IV: the theol-
ogical analysis of Spirit as the answer to the quest for the 
unambiguous life. Chapter three attempted to analyze Tillich's 
understanding of religion as the function of the spirit which 
forces man to face the question of ambiguous life and makes him 
receptive to some answer. 
CONCLUSION 
Anyone interested in contemporary thought about religion 
and the religious dimension of man cannot easily avoid the 
contributions made by Paul Tillich. He has been widely read 
and his thought has influenced many contemporary thinkers. 
Many have been his devoted pupils; many have evaluated and 
criticized his contributions to the philosophy of religion. 
Some of his vocabulary has become almost standard for anyone 
involved in speaking about religion and the things of religion. 
Much of Tillich's work has been concerned with providing 
man with a vocabulary, often strange and untraditional, to 
express, understand, and communicate the hopes and experiences 
which underlie religious phenomena. Tillich focused much of 
. . 
his attention upon man's use of words, symbols, myths, and 
images to articulate his religious depths. But often, Tillich's 
own terminology and statements proved difficult to understand 
and somewhat confusing. This paper has attempted to analyze 
some of the principles, definitions, and terms of Paul Tillich's 
philosophy of religion. The attempt was made by focusing upon 
Tillich's thought in Part IV of his Systematic Theology. In 
this part of his monumental work Tillich considered religion 
and the religious dimension of man in terms of ambiguous and 
unambiguous life. 
?4 
?5 
In the hope of presenting a systematic treatment Tillich 
in Part IV used the concept of life to organize and develop 
his thought. With the basic distinction of ambiguous and 
unambiguous life, Tillich hoped to find a starting point espe-
cially conducive for a dialogue between his own theological-
religious perspective and the insights of modern science. By 
using this concept of life Tillich formulated some principles, 
definitions, and terms by which he hoped religion and the reli-
gious dimension of man could be more· clearly evaluated, criti-
cized, and appreciated by contemporary man. 
This paper attempted to analyze this fundamental concept 
of life not so much to show how it functioned in Part IV as 
the organizing concept but so that some of the principles, 
definitions, and terms of Tillich's philosophy of religion 
could be better understood. In attempting to present its 
analysis this paper tried to make two important points. 
First, Tillich's use of the concept of life and of the 
fundamental distinction of ambiguous and unambiguous life 
points to a fundamental and perduring concern in his thought. 
Man has tremendous potential especially in terms of personal 
growth and cultural activity, but his potential without crea-
tive limits can become tragic and self-destructive. Man 
needs limits, norms, values, ultimates and absolutes by which 
he can create, direct, organize, integrate his life. Without 
proper orientation human life is chao'tic. Man is in need of 
order; he needs justification. ·perhaps, Tillich's Lutheran 
heritage is most apparent in this concern. What was apparent 
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as the analysis of this paper was ·being made was that, in terms 
of life, Tillich was once again restating a fundamental and 
central concern in his thought. 
Secondly, this paper attempted to provide a schema or 
structure to better understand Tillich's analyses in Part IV. 
By utilizing this schema of two corresponding realities (the 
self-transcendence of life and the experience of the trans-
cendent), this paper attempted to clarify his analysis of the 
three functions of life (self-integration, self-creativity, 
and self-transcendence) and the three functions of the spirit 
(morality, culture, and religion). This schema hoped to 
provide a structure by which Tillich's analysis of religious 
transcendence and the religious experience of the transcendent 
could be better understood especially in relation to the 
transcendence and the experience of the transcendent in moral 
responsibility and cultural creativity. 
By making these two points this paper attempted not only 
to make more intelligible Tillich's thought in Part IV of his 
Systematic Theolo~ but also to make some contribution to a 
better understanding of Tillich's thought in general. 
Paul Tillich was a Protestant Christian theologian and 
a philosophical thinker who attempted to share his faith 
insights and philosophical reflections with contemporary men. 
He wanted to speak about man's hopeful possibilities and about 
the deep foundations for those possibilities. Yet, Tillich 
was quite critical of this human potential. He saw man's needs 
for limits, norms, and absolutes. For Tillich, religion with 
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its language and symbols, with its heroes and prophets~ provides 
man with ultimate limits. Religion can protect man from his 
own tendency to be victimized by his own il~usions and self-
delusions. It can provide what humanism and the secular world 
cannot, a criticism against the superficial, arbitrary, and 
illusory and a promise that can excite and recreate man in 
an otherwise threatening situation. 
Paul Tillich's philosophy of religion was an attempt by 
a theologian and philosopher to describe some men's experience 
of criticism and promise in a situation mixed with opportunity 
and threat. This paper has attempted to analyze some of the 
principles, definitions, and terms of his philosophy of 
religion. 
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